Friday, August 18, 2017

The Great Power Autism of China (An Analysis)




China’s intentions of creating territorial tensions and conflicts in the neighborhood far and near has left the world in a tizzy. Its coercive adamancy in South China Sea, its inimical designs for Japan and South Korea vis a vis North, antagonistic overtures to India and tiny nations of South Asia directly and indirectly including playing with Nepal’s fears of Indian aggression, its fomenting Pakistan’s anti India adventures, its Tibet and Taiwan ownership, are all but few signs of a nation’s hegemonistic nausea.   

India China have reached a point of serious war mongering on Doklam trijunction with both sides refusing to withdraw after 70 days of standoff in a more than eyeball to eyeball confrontation.  If we listen to what China says we need to vacate the Doklam area which belongs to them as against Bhutanese claims. Doklam, or as the Chinese call it Donglang, is the trijunction on Bhutan-India-China border. In the OBOR outreach China was caught on the wrong foot constructing road across the Bhutanese border that is of high strategic value for India giving it an edge at peeping at our chicken neck juncture.  

Although there’s nothing new in both India and China flexing their muscles over territorial issues, China's ambitious initiative of One Belt One Road, a multilayered project aimed at far reaching imperialistic designs smartly crafted is germane to it. Its impressive economics are equally justifiable.

Emboldened by its belligerent advances in the South China sea and a fairly successful One China Policy, China assumed its unhindered passage through Bhutanese territory would have been a cake walk. At stake Bhutanese and Indian strategic and security interests, the retaliation by India in terms of troops build up in Doklam was a blow to Chinese grand design of engulfing the South Asian region bit by bit.

Its not just the matter of India being in pact with Bhutan over being a security guarantor, our concern articulates a larger hemisphere of the challenge it poses to India's sovereignty. Incidentally events like these take years to finally come to resolve. And considering the fact that the Chinese Congress is due later half of this year the stand off will be taking longer. Ineluctably domestic politics is something that no nation can overlook. Historically Wangdung in the eastern sector took 1986 to 1992 to be resolved. Sumdrochung stand-off continued for nearly a decade before there was an agreed mutual withdrawal. Ever since Tibet in 1960 it was always a militarized relationship between the two Asian giants although since Sikkim integration this kind of public spatting has not been seen like the present one on Doklam. 
    
The Chinese chose to change the status quo this year when the season came. So why did they do
it? Ostensibly there's no legal argument that they are pursuing on where the trijunction is, neither is there any possibility of a huge military gain for them right now. They are also well aware of India’s hefty presence with a fair amount of dominance, so there has to be some other gain. 

Interestingly China is a nation in a hurry. Its vision of being at the top emanates from its obsessed nationalism and its history of colonialism. The fous et origen of China's expansionist misadventures mirrors its sense of insecurity and so as a policy, nationalism thus becomes a crucial element in legitimizing Communist party rule.

The sloganeering of 'China Dream' by Xi leverages Chinese nationalism directly to the nation’s economic prosperity and globalization. Be it OBOR, One China Policy, South China Sea or China Dream, all are manifestations of the same simmering aspiration. BRI other than connectivity, is anchored in China's domestic as well as foreign policy. Additionally it also addresses the problem of overcapacity of its domestic market giving Beijing a seamless opportunity to spread its political influence along with global dominance aggressively.

China suffers from what Luttwak, a US strategy Expert, called ‘Great Power Autism’, as analysts rightly put it. Something that leaves the power insensitive to others concerns, which is what is happening to Chinese diplomacy. The hurry to become 'the' world power, (which it will be in future with the collapsing west), can be attributed to the fact of the expediency of its rise, accumulation of much hard power and its ascendency to power on the international stage. Characteristically Chinese are also apprehensive because they are not used to it and so not sure of it. Their moment of strategic opportunities, for them is 'now' when their relative power is probably the highest, maybe the highest it will be. Multiple factors like demography, their apprehension of a strategic push back, the power’s non feasibility, that they might grow old before they grow rich, ecology, the fear of not being able to sustain what they have achieved so far, how will their society absorb it, then where do they go, seem to be a cause of anxious worry to them. What they have achieved in such a short span of time is incredible and also the reason of their arrogance. The logical outcome then will be counterbalancing.

Again media plays a major role in propagating political decisions and building up phony war rhetoric. In China like in all communist countries media is not free. Everything in China is official and have their assigned functions. Global times is like their pitbull, to make sure that China news gets everywhere with big noises. People’s Daily and Zinhua articulate what is being told by the parties to their cadres and so more realistic. What has changed is Chinese signaling has shifted. They have realized the larger utility of creating noise to the people and social media has played a pivotal role in this direction. The one constant is the psychological pressure tactics used by them on other countries to fulfill their agenda. Noticeably Doklam standoff has been no issue for Chinese media including their social media. It’s the US North Korea engagements thats sending jitters to the press and people.  
As per Defense sources China will not risk an all-out war in the Doklam area as it is well aware of its disadvantageous position at Sikkim Bhutan China trijunction. As a policy by needling in Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh and Barahoti in Himachal it is ratchting up pressure to unilaterally withdraw. By standing by Thimpu in the case of Chinese interception India has been successful in sending a terse message across. Seen in the larger context it is this challenge of authority that is irking China. On home turf China is in a churn. Politically President Jingping is to face the 19th Congress to establish himself and consolidate power, economically China is not doing too well and militarily its undergoing the greatest reformation and are not in a state of readiness to fight a war. Xi on the other hand has pitched himself to his as people as someone who positions himself with Trump. As opposed to Trump he has vouched for globalization and climate change, taken firm stands on SCS and OBOR to impress upon his constituency. Internationally China is under great pressure from US to bring North Korea under control with whom China has immense trade relations. US threatens sanctions on China if it does not make Pyongyang fall in line. China is already messed up in South China Sea.   

As for Bhutan China relations China does not have an embassy in Thimpu which China is trying hard for negotiating bilateral issues. Chinese have to dish out 250 dollars in advance to enter Bhutan as opposed to free entry of Indians in the Himalayan state. But Bhutan is well aware that once China comes into Bhutan will not be the same.

Despite China having made so much noise on Doklam, India chose to stay away from the bellicose rhetoric. Refusing to playing in their hands India’s quiet diplomacy worked to our advantage not just in passive support of India from powers like US and Japan but it also helped in reigning in worsening of the war mongering accompanied with media flare ups. Our restrained reaction kept the Chinese guessing too, blunting their war of perception to comatose.

Doklam standoff is here to stay, say Defence sources, as technically no trijunction issues with China are in a condition of resolution till the entire LAC of 4,057 km is sorted out. India’s in a commanding position in this 89 sq kilometer area and China is testing us to buckle in. Neither did President Xi Jingping mention Doklam in his address on August 1 nor did PM Modi talk of it in his ID day speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort. It would be a long haul before the forces finally withdraw, as history teaches us.   

Surely the India of 1962 is not the same as China of 1962.









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